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TAMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE'S
TOOTHLESS TIGER, 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)
Julio M. Zapata
Absftract Federal appellate courts are divided on whether a debtor who files a Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition and is current on the underlying contractual obligation secured by
collateral is able to retain the collateral without redeeming it or reaffirming the debt under
section 521(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits hold that the Code's
options are not exclusive. Thus, the debtor may retain the collateral and continue under the
terms of the contract as long as the payments are current In contrast, the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits hold that a debtor's only options are those listed in section 521(2):
surrender, redeem, or reaffirm. After examining the history and impact of redemption and
reaffirmation, and the circuit court decisions, this Comment argues that the options listed in
section 521(2) are not exclusive and urges the adoption of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits'
reasoning. Adopting the non-exclusive approach does not alter the substantive rights of the
debtor, supports the proposition that section 521(2) is primarily a notice requirement, and
promotes the Bankruptcy Code's underlying policy of providing a fresh start to the debtor.

Joe and Jane purchased an automobile financed by XYZ finance
company on an installment plan. The finance company took a security
interest in the car. Previously, Joe and Jane had established good credit
but accumulated several debts. After this purchase, they experienced
financial difficulty and filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Joe and Jane's payments were not current on some debts; but they
were current on the automobile. In their Chapter 7 case, Joe and Jane
filed a statement of intent, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A),
indicating that they would retain the automobile. Joe and Jane did not,
however, indicate that they intended to redeem the collateral by paying
the creditor the market value of the car, or that they intended to reaffirm
the debt by signing an agreement with the creditor renegotiating the
terms of the loan and remaining personally liable for the loan after
discharge. Instead, the debtors sought to continue making timely
payments under the terms of their original agreement.
In response, XYZ finance company moved the bankruptcy court to
compel Joe and Jane either to give up the car, pay off the debt, or
reaffirm the debt. The company argued that section 521(2)(A) restricts
debtors to these options. The debtors countered that they had met the
requirements of section 521(2)(A) by stating their intent both to retain
the automobile and remain current on the note. They asserted that if they
had not filed for bankruptcy, XYZ finance company could not have
repossessed or invoked other realization remedies because they were
current on their obligations. Thus, they argued that XYZ company should
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not be able to force them either to surrender, redeem, or reaffirm on a
loan that was not in default simply because they had filed for Chapter 7
relief.
This scenario is a common one. In 1996, the total number of
nonbusiness bankruptcies exceeded 1.1 million.' Creditors attempt to
force debtors to redeem or reaffirm when debtors are current on their
payments and elect to retain the collateral.2 Many of these cases go
uncontested because the collateral does not have great monetary value.
Thus, even though these items may be essential to a deb:or's livelihood,
the cost of litigation generally outweighs the cost of replacement.3
Courts are divided on whether section 521(2) 4 simply imposes a notice
requirement on debtors or substantially alters their rights.' Currently,
four federal courts of appeals disagree on this question.6 Specifically,
they disagree about whether a Chapter 7 debtor who is current on
installment payments to a lender (and not otherwise in default) may
retain collateral securing a dischargeable consumer debt without either
redeeming the collateral under section 722' or reaffirming the debt under
1. See Bankruptcy Filings Reach All-Time High, Again, Bankr. Strategist, Apr. 1997, at 9, 9; ABI
World, Quarterly Non-Business Bankruptcy Filingsfor 1994-1997 (2nd) (visited Oct. 19, 1997)
<http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1994quarternonbus.html>.
2. As of October, 164 cases addressed this issue. Search of LEXIS, Bkrtcy Library, Cases File,
keyword "521(2)" (Oct. 19, 1997).
3. See infra note 21 (discussing high replacement cost).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (1994). Section 521(2) provides:
(2) if an individual debtor's schedule of assets and liabilities includes consumer debts which are
secured by property of the estate(A) within thirty days after the date of the filing of a petition under chapter 7 of this title or on or
before the date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or within suca additional time as
the court, for cause, within such period fixes, the debtor shall file with the clerk a statement of
his intention with respect to the retention or surrender of such property and, ifapplicable,
specifying that such property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor inten:ds to redeem such
property, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such property;
(B) within forty-five days after the filing of a notice of intent under this section, or within such
additional time as the court, for cause, within such forty-five day period fixes, the debtor shall
perform his intention with respect to such property, as specified by subpaitgraph (A) of this
paragraph; and
(C) nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall alter the debtor's or the
trustee's rights with regard to such property under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (emphasis added).
5. See, e.g., In re Weir,173 B.R. 682, 683 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994) (posing question, "Is there any
bite in the Bankruptcy Code's toothless tiger, 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)?").
6. See infra notes 58, 78 and accompanying text.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1994). Section 722 states:
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section 524,8 by merely continuing to make timely payments under the
contract.
The differences among the courts turn on the interpretation of the
phrase "if applicable," which precedes the redeem or reaffirm options in
the statute.9 The nonexclusive approach suggests that these options are
not "applicable" when debtors elect to retain the collateral and are
current on their payments. Conversely, the exclusive approach suggests
that the options are "applicable" if the debtors choose to retain the
collateral, regardless of whether debtors are current on their payments.
Neither the Ninth Circuit nor five other circuit courts have addressed this
issue.'" The conflicting approaches have a significant impact on debtors
and creditors. Thus, this issue is ripe for U.S. Supreme Court review or
clarification by Congress.
This Comment supports the nonexclusive approach and argues that
debtors who remain current on installment contracts should not be
limited to the options listed in section 521(2) if they choose to retain
their collateral. Part I addresses the statutory framework and the impact
of redemption and reaffirmation. Part II examines the scant legislative
history pertaining to section 521. Part III discusses the split among the
federal courts. Part IV argues for the adoption of the nonexclusive
approach based on the reasoning of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits.
I.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

A.

Policies Underlying the Bankruptcy Code

Chapter 7 bankruptcy serves primarily to equitably distribute a
debtor's assets among creditors and, where appropriate, to discharge
certain obligations and leave the debtor without personal obligation as to
those debts. In contrast, Chapter 13 bankruptcy allows a debtor to file a
An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to redeem under this
section, redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family, or household
use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt, if such property is exempted under
section 522 of this title or has been abandoned under section 554 of this title, by paying the
holder of such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by
such lien.
11 U.S.C. § 722.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1994) (outlining requirements for valid reaffirmation agreement).
9. See supranote 4.
10. The First, Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have not addressed whether
debtors current on their secured debts may retain collateral without redeeming or reaffirming their
debts, although several bankruptcy courts within the respective circuits have done so.
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plan to provide for full repayment, in deferred cash payments, to a
creditor." Under either form of bankruptcy, the underlying goal is to
provide a fresh start for debtors and restore debtors' capacities as
productive participants in the economy. 2
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified two primary purposes
underlying the Bankruptcy Act: "to convert the estate of the bankrupt
into cash and distribute it among creditors, and then to give the bankrupt
a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left
untouched."' 3 These policies, according to the Court, are of "great public
interest, in that [they secure] to the unfortunate debtor, who surrenders
his property for distribution, a new opportunity in life."' 4
B.

Debtors'DutiesUnderSection 521

Filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy triggers many duties under section
521. '" Thele duties allow creditors to obtain critical information
regarding the collateral, thereby suggesting that the prirmary purpose of
the section is notice. Section 521(2) requires debtors to declare within
thirty days after the date of the filing 6 whether they intend to retain or
surrender the collateral in question, and to perform their intention within
forty-five days of filing. 7 If debtors choose to surrender the property,
then all personal obligations for the debt are extinguished. If, on the
other hand, debtors choose to retain the collateral, ther. section 521(2)
requires the debtor, "if applicable, [to specify] such property... as
exempt... redeem such property, or ... reaffirm debts secured by such
Is
property."'

11. 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994).
12. See generally DouglassG. Boshkoff, Fresh Start,FalseStart,or HeadStart?, 70 Ind. L.J. 549
(1995) (discussing brief history of bankruptcy legislation in United States and development of fresh
start policy).
13. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913); see also Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 541
(1885).
14. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918).

15. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (1994).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) (1994).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(B) (1994).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A).
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C.

Redemption and Reaffirmation

It is first necessary to understand the options available to the debtor.
Redemption is one of the three options section 521(2) suggests for a
debtor. In contrast, reaffirmation is the alternative that arises when
debtors choose to retain collateral and remain current on their payments.
1.

Redemption

a.

Background

Under section 722,19 a Chapter 7 debtor may redeem certain secured
property by paying the creditor the approximate fair market value of the
property or the amount of the lien, whichever is less.20 Section 722 gives
debtors an option to retain goods essential to their households, thereby
avoiding the high cost of replacement if the property is repossessed by
secured creditors.2 Section 722' allows an individual debtor in a
Chapter 7 case to redeem tangible personal property, intended primarily
for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a consumer
debt.' Redemption is only available, however, if a debtor's interest in
the property isexempt24 or has been abandoned.'

19. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1994).
20. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Polk (In re Polk), 76 B.R. 148, 150 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1055 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983).
21. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 127 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6088
(discussing high replacement cost of household goods and creditors' ability to use threat of
repossession to have debtor either redeem or reaffirm); see also David Gray Carlson, Redemption
and Reinstatement in Chapter 7 Cases, 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 289 (1996) (discussing issues
relating to redemption).
22. See supra note 7.
23. "Consumer debt" means debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or
household purpose. 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (1994) (e.g., automobiles, refrigerators, televisions, and
general appliances).
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994) (outlining deductions for certain collateral that debtor may retain).
There are several exemptions that are limited by a dollar amount. See Carlson, supra note 21, at 293.
The debtor pays the market value or loan amount, whichever is less.
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1994) (allowing redemption if property "has been abandoned under
section 554"). A debtor may also redeem property if the bankruptcy trustee has abandoned it. The
trustee is a representative of the creditors. See generally David G. Epstein et al., Bankruptcy § 1-4, at
6-8 (1993). Generally, the trustee will abandon property if the collateral is over-encumbered and the
debtor's equity holds no value.
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Lump-Sum Versus InstallmentRedemption
In enacting section 722, Congress failed to specify whether a debtor

may redeem by installment payments or through a lump-sum payment.26
The federal circuit courts are divided on the issue.27 In re Clark and In re
Carroll are good examples of courts providing for redemption by
installment under section 722.8 These courts reason that "the right to
redeem is meaningless if the debtor cannot exercise it."'29 The purpose
behind bankruptcy is to rehabilitate debtors. Thus, the method of
payment, absent legislative intent, does not affect creditors' rights.3"
However, the majority of courts have found the interest of protecting a
creditor's recovery of its secured claim sufficient to require lump-sum
payment under section 722. 3' In in re Hart,32 for example, the court first
determined that the value of a secured creditor's claim should be fixed as
of the date of the debtor's filing of bankruptcy.3 The court cited a House
report indicating that once a creditor's secured claim is determined, the
court is required to ensure that the creditor's collateral is not eroded by

26. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1055 (6th Cir.
1983) ("[Section] 722 is facially silent as to the mechanics of redemption and, particularly, on
whether the redemption may be accomplished through installment payments.").
27. See In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1385 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating two options for debtors under
§ 722); Bell, 700 F.2d at 1055 (discussing debtor's options for redeeming collateral); In re
Zimmerman, 4 B.R. 739, 740 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (allowing redemption of tangible personal
property). Compare Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Polk (In re Polk), 76 B.R. 148. 150 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1987) (stating that redemption must be made through lump-sum payment), and Bell, 700 F.2d at
1055 (requiring lump-sum payment), with Clark v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (Tn re Clark), 10 B.L
605, 607 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1981) (granting use of installment method for redemption payments), and
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hall (In re Hall), 11 B.R. 3, 5 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980) (allowing
installment method for redemption of property). See generally Arizona Bank v. Carroll (In re
Carroll), 11 B.R. 725, 726 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981) (holding that lump-sum payaent must be made);
In re Harp, 76 B.R. 185, 186-87 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987) (interpreting § 722 to require lump-sum
payments).
28. Clark 10B.R. at 607; Arizona Bank v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 7 B.R. 907, 910 (Bankr.
D. Ariz.), rev'd, 11 B.R. 725.
29. Clark, 10 B.R. at 607; see also Carroll,7 B.R. at 909.
30. Carroll,7 B.R. at 909.
31. See, e.g., Polk 76 B.R. at 150; Bell, 700 F.2d at 1058; In re Tucker, 158 B.R. 150, 150-51
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993); Century Bank v. Peacock (In re Peacock), 87 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1988); Harp, 76 B.R. at 187; Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank v. Davis (in re Davis), 20 B.R.
212, 214 (C.D. Ill.
1982); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Schweitzer (In re Schweitzer), 19 B.R. 860, 864
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Whatley, 16 B.R. 394, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); In re
Crusetumer, 8 B.R. 581, 582 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
32. First Bank & Trust Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 8 B.R. 1020 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1981).
33. Id. at 1022.
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delay or use by the estate." Specifically, the court considered the
consequences that would result if the debtor discontinued installment
payments after the discharge. The court hypothesized that if the debtor
were paying one hundred dollars per month, it was likely that the car
securing the loan balance would depreciate more than six hundred dollars
if default occurred at six months.35 Thus, the court reasoned that the
creditor would be better off with lump-sum redemption.36 These courts,
therefore, have emphasized creditor interests.
2.

Reaffirmation

Discharge from bankruptcy ordinarily relieves a debtor of personal
liability for any pre-bankruptcy debts. Reaffirmation is the process of
negotiating a voluntary agreement between the creditor and debtor
whereby the creditor retains personal liability for the contract after
discharge.3 7 Often a debtor may wish to remain in good standing with a
creditor by negotiating an agreement stating that the debtor shall pay the
creditor despite past or future financial problems. 8
a.

CreditorUsually Seeks Identical ContractTerms

If a debt is properly reaffirmed, 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) provides that the
debt may be enforced against the debtor even after a discharge is
granted.39 Thus, the personal liability that discharge would have
eliminated is retained under a reaffirmation agreement.
Creditors prefer to have debtors reaffirm because they can reestablish
principle, interest, payments, and duration identical to the original

34. Id.
35. Id. at 1022-23.

36. 1la at 1023.
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1994).
38. Although the issue is outside the scope of this Comment, "ipso facto" or default clauses
arguably trigger an event of default even if payments are current. See General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that ipso facto clause exists only in
bankruptcy). But see I1 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) (1994) (providing that ipso facto clauses are void in
bankruptcy); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Perry (In re Perry), 729 F.2d 982, 984-85 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding
ipso facto clause unenforceable as matter of law); In re Kunstler, 38 B.R. 207, 209-10 (Bankr. M.D.
La. 1984) (suggesting in dicta that § 524(c) renders ipso facto clauses void even after discharge);
First & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Ballance (In re Ballance), 33 B.R. 89, 90-91 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1983) (finding ipso facto clauses invalid, and noting that such clauses are contrary to fresh start
policy).
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c).
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contract.4 Consequently, if a debtor reaffirms a note sec'aring collateral,

it is as if the debtor never filed for bankruptcy. One commentator
observed that by obtaining a reaffirmation, a creditor :Is actually in a
better position than before the debtor filed for bankruptcy because after
the debtor has been discharged, the debtor is precluded from obtaining
another discharge within six years." Conversely, debtors are worse off
because they lose the ability to discharge their debts.
b.

Both PartiesMust Agree to Reaffirmation

Generally, reaffirmation agreements are scrutinized to protect a debtor
from an overreaching creditor.42 This minimizes the possibility of the
creditor coercing the debtor and allows the debtor to be fully informed.
To fulfill this objective, Congress created an enforcement mechanism.
Enforceability requires that the reaffirmation agreement: (1) be entered
into before a discharge is granted; (2) contain a clear and conspicuous
statement concerning the debtor's right to rescind the agreement at any
time before discharge or within sixty days after the agreement is filed
with the court, whichever is later; (3) be filed with the court; (4) not have
been rescinded by the debtor; and (5) be an informed, voluntary
agreement by the debtor and one that does not impose an undue hardship
on the debtor or the debtor's dependents.4 3 Court approval is required
when the debtor is not represented by an attorney.' These provisions
ensure that the parties have reached a consensual agreement.

40. See generally Oliver B. Pollak, Reaffirmation and Retention in Bankruptcy: Conflict in the
Circuitsover Protectingthe Secured Creditor,111 Banking L.L 302 (1994).
41. See generally Aaron C. von Staats, Ipso Facto Clauses and Chapter 7 Bankruptcies:
Superfluous ContractProvisions,EnforceablePrenuptials,or Contrary to the Fresh Start?, 32 B.C.
L. Rev. 703, 737 n.188 (1991).
42. See In re Peterson, 110 B.R. 946, 949-50 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In r? Eccleston, 70 B.RL
210,212 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1986).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c). Rule 4008 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provides that the court
may not hold a discharge hearing pursuant to § 524(d) more than 30 days afler entry of an order
granting or denying a discharge without at least 10 days notice to the debtor and the trustee, and the
debtor's motion for approval of any reaffirmation agreement must be filed at or before the hearing.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6XA); see also 130 Cong. Rec. H7497, H7499 (daily ed. June 29, 1984)
(statements of Reps. Brooks and Anderson); Michael G. Williamson et al., Consumer Credit
Changes to the Bankruptcy Laws: A Hodgepodge for Creditors and Debtors, 58 Fla. BJ. 553
(1984). Practitioners may be particularly aware that the amendment places a great burden on the
debtor's attorney. One commentator recognized that the potential for malpractice is great. The
attorney, unlike the court, is not saved by judicial immunity. Bradley Scott McKim, Congressional
Intent and JudicialResponse: The Consumer Credit Amendments of the 1984 Bankruptcy Act, 21
Land & Water L. Rev. 181, 193-94 (1986) (citing Williamson et al., supra,at 554).
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D.

The Nonexclusive Approach Conforms to Section 521(2)

Under the nonexclusive approach, debtors file for Chapter 7
bankruptcy and list all debts they owe to creditors pursuant to
section 521. At such time, debtors file a statement of intent, as required
by this section, stating that they intend to retain the collateral and remain
current on the payments to the particular creditor. The debtors are
unlikely to seek redemption because a lump sum payment would be
significantly higher than the monthly amount being paid. Reaffirmation
is unlikely because the debtors do not need to renegotiate the agreement
with creditors, for they are current on the note and complying with the
terms of the agreement.
Moreover, providing notice to the creditor that the debtor intends to
retain the collateral and keep current on the agreement gives the creditor
the information required to know what will happen with the collateral. If
the debtor were to later default on the agreement, the creditor could rely
on state remedies to repossess the collateral. Of course, the creditor
would not have the ability to obtain a personal deficiency, but neither
would the creditor have this option at the time of bankruptcy. More
importantly, for policy reasons Congress has determined that debtors
deserve a fresh start to pull themselves back up and again become
productive citizens in the community.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)

The legislative history of section 521(2) is minimal.45 Several
proposed amendments, however, shed some light on the purposes behind
the section.
Congress added section 521(2) to the Bankruptcy Code when it passed
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.46
Commentators describe this section as essentially a notice requirement
permitting secured creditors to ascertain debtor intentions early in
bankruptcy proceedings. The idea for section 521(2)(A) originated
from a proposal by a coalition of bankers, credit unions, finance
45. See In re Castillo, 209 B.1. 59, 67 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) (outlining legislative history),
rev'd sub noma.Government Employees Credit Union v. Castillo (In re Castillo), No. EP-97-CA206-H, 1997 WL 613073 (W.D. Tex. July 29, 1997).
46. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 305, 98 Stat. 333, 352-53 (1984) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§ 521 (1994)).
47. See, e.g., Henry J. Sommer, The 1984 Changes in Consumer Bankruptcy Law, 31 Prac. Law.,
Jan. 15, 1985, at 45, 55.
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companies, retailers, and oil companies.4" At Senate subcommittee
hearings in 198 l," witnesses appearing on behalf of the coalition and the
American Bankers Association voiced their concern that creditors

holding secured claims in consumer Chapter 7 cases often had no
information regarding their collateral.5 0 The witnesses argued that
because the automatic stay prohibited contact with debtors, secured
creditors typically knew nothing about the status of the collateral."'
Secured creditors wanted to avoid incurring the expense of filing a
motion to lift the stay, only later to learn that the debtors elways intended
to surrender the property without a contest.5 2 They proposed a solution
requiring debtors to disclose their intentions with respect to the property
at an early stage.

48. See Jim D. Pappas, Section 521(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Credi'or'sPredicamentin
GettingPaidas Agreed, 99 Com. L.J. 45, 47 (1994). Pappas writes that Congress enacted § 521(2)
because "a vocal coalition of consumer creditors advocated numerous changes and additions to the
Code concerning consumer credit in particular. After vigorous debate, some of the suggested
changes became law as a package known as the 'Consumer Credit Amendments."' Id.; see also
Elizabeth Warren, Reducing Bankruptcy Protectionfor Consumers: A Response, 72 Geo. L.J. 1333
(1984) (writing that Consumer Credit Amendments were due in large part to co:acerted effort on part
of creditor lobbying groups who believed that 1978 Act favored debtors); Ned W. Waxman,
Redemption or Reaffirmation: The Debtor'sExclusive Means ofRetainingPossession of Collateral
in Chapter 7, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 187 (1994) (proposing that Congress add "retention" category,
which would make debt nondischargeable and allow debtor to retain collateral without redeeming or
reaffirming).
49. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong. (1981).
50. Id. at 39-106 (testimony of Prof. Jonathan Landers, Claude Rice, and Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr.,
coalition consultants), 144-53 (statements of Walter W. Vaughan and A. Thomas Small, American
Bankers Ass'n).
51. See generally id. at 44-46. Claude Rice and Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., representing the consumer
credit coalition, explained why the amendment to § 521 was necessary:
Mr. Rice: It is a debtor's statement of what he intends to do. Then impose a duty on him to do
whatever he suggests. At the presenttime.., the debtor is not requiredto do a thing butjust sit
back and stonewall it. That causes an unnecessary burden.
Mr. Wiese: The thing we have seen under the new code is the inability beiween debtors and
creditors to communicate with each other.... [I]t is our perception that a great many of the
adversary proceedings that are clogging the court system ... could be resolved if the debtor was
made to undertake the responsibility of giving creditors information before the first meeting of
creditors, as to what they intend to do with the collateral. Do they intend to redeem it, surrender
it, reaffirm the obligation, or what.
Id. at 44, 46 (emphasis added).
52. See Robert E. Ginsberg, The ProposedBankruptcy Improvements Act: The Creditors Strike
Back, 3 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 1, 37 (1982) (reasoning that idea behind proposal is for debtor to announce
intention).
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The consumer amendments and consumer bankruptcy amendments
proposed by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1982 and 1983 were the
subject of considerable debate. 3 The Senate report stated that the
proposed amendments to section 521 "encourage the debtor and creditor
to settle issues involving secured debt without judicial proceedings...
[and] identify disputed matters at an early stage so that they may be
resolved at the meeting of creditors. This will avoid the time and expense
of separate and delayed proceedings."'
No Senate or House report accompanied the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, which ultimately included section
521(2)."5 One court described the legislative history as "woefully
inadequate.""6 The only explanation of the rights reserved to the debtor
and trustee under section 521(2) was made by Chairman Rodino.
According to Rodino, the duty imposed under section 521(2) "does not
affect the substantive provisions of the code which may grant the trustee
or debtor rights with regard to such property."" Whether section 521(2)
does, in fact, alter a debtor's rights is precisely the issue on which the
courts are divided.
III. COURTS DISAGREE ON THE EXCLUSIVITY OF
SECTION 521(2) OPTIONS
A.

A Majority of Courts Holds that Section 521(2) Options Are Not
Exclusive

The majority of courts holds that a debtor's options are not limited to
those listed in 11 U.S.C. § 521(2).58 The Fourth and Tenth Circuits
53. Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983, S.445, 98th Cong. (1983); S.2000, 97th
Cong. (1982); S.Rep. No. 97-446 (1982); see also H.R. 4786, 97th Cong. (1981); S.Rep. No. 98-65
(1983); Robert E. Ginsberg, The Bankz'uptcy Improvement Act-An Update, 3 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 235

(1983).
54. S.Rep. No. 97-446, at 41.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (1994); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
56. In re Eagle, 51 B.R. 959, 961 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); see also National Bank of
Commerce v. Barriger (In re Barriger), 61 B.R. 506,509 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986).
57. 130 Cong. Rec. H6204 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984) (statement ofRep. Rodino).
58. See Mayton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Mayton), 208 B.R. 61, 67 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997);
Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 346 (4th Cir.
1992); Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Castillo, 209
B.R. 59, 66 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) (reviewing cases and legislative history), rev'd sub nom.
Government Employees Credit Union v. Castillo (In re Castillo), No. EP-97-CA-206-H, 1997 WL
613073 (W.D. Tex. July 29, 1997); First N. Am. Nat'l Bank v. Doss (In re Doss), 203 B.R. 57,
59-60 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1996) (holding that debtor's statement of intentions satisfies duty under
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embrace the view that debtors may retain secured property without

making an election under section 521(2)(A) provided they meet two
requirements. First, the debtors may not otherwise be in default prior to
discharge. Second, apart from bankruptcy filing, no grounds may exist
that would authorize repossession of the collateral. 9
Lowry FederalCredit Union v. West 6° is representative of these cases.
In West, the debtors filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7
approximately fourteen months after securing a loan to finance the
purchase of a pick-up truck from Lowry Federal Credit Union.6' Both
before and after the time of filing, the debtors were current on their
payments and had maintained insurance on the vehicle. 62 The debtors
filed a statement of intent declaring that they planned to retain the truck;
however, they failed to state within forty-five days of filing whether they
intended to redeem the vehicle or reaffirm the loan.6' Lowry threatened
to repossess the vehicle if the debtors did not elect one of the options
listed in the statute.' The bankruptcy court found that the debtors were
not in default and therefore enjoined Lowry from repossessing the truck
so long as the debtors stayed current on their payments, kept adequate

§ 521(2), and choices listed in section are not exclusive); In re Ogando, 203 B.R. 14, 15 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1996) (holding that § 521(2) is merely procedural statute, which by ts own terms is not
intended to infringe upon any rights debtor has with respect to collateral, and debtor may retain
collateral and keep current on payments or default and risk repossession by creditor); Capital
Communications Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 197 B.R. 409, 412 (N.D.N.Y.
1996) (concluding that options listed in § 521 are not exclusive); In re Parlato, 185 B.R. 413, 417
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (holding that debtors may retain secured property if they are not otherwise in
default); In re Weir, 173 B.R. 682, 693 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that options are not
exclusive, and outlining legislative history); First Nat'l Bank of Union Co v. Shubert (In re
Shubert), 147 B.R. 618, 619 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) (affirming debtor's right to retain property);
In re Parker, 142 B.RL 327, 331 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992) (holding that § 521 permits Chapter 7
debtors to retain property); In re Donley, 131 B.R. 193, 196 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that
debtors have right to maintain possession of collateral); In re McNeil, 128 B.IL 603, 608 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1991) (permitting retention of secured property by debtor); In re Crcuch, 104 B.IL 770,
773-74 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1989) (upholding debtor's right to retain secured property in
accordance with longstanding bankruptcy principles).
59. West, 882 F.2d at 1545.
60. Id. at 1543.
61. Id. at 1545.
62. Id.
63. ld
64. Id
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insurance, and were not otherwise in default.65 The district court
affirmed,6 and Lowry appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit examined the language of the statute and concluded
that while the requirements of section 521(2) were mandatory, nothing in
section 521(2) gave a secured creditor an automatic right to repossess
collateral if a debtor chose not to exercise one of the options listed in the
statute.67 The court explained that, "[w]hile a debtor may redeem
property, subject to 11 U.S.C. § 722, or reaffirm a debt, subject to
11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4), nothing within the Code makes either course
exclusive. ' 6 Therefore, the court reasoned, the creditor would not be
prejudiced by the debtor's retaining the vehicle after discharge because
the creditor could resort to state remedies upon default.6 9
The Fourth Circuit followed West in In re Belanger." The Belangers
had purchased a mobile home financed by Home Owners Funding
Corporation of America, and in bankruptcy they filed a statement of
intention pursuant to section 521(2)(A) indicating that they would retain
the mobile home.7' The finance company moved the bankruptcy court to
compel the Belangers to choose one of the options listed in section
521(2), arguing that these options were exclusive.' The court denied the
motion, finding that the Belangers had complied with section 521(2)(A)
by giving notice73 of their intent to retain the property while continuing
to make payments in accordance with their contract.74 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit held that section 521(2) was essentially a procedural
device that did not prevent a Chapter 7 debtor from retaining collateral
after discharge and making required timely loan payments without either
65. Id
66. West v. Lowry Fed. Credit Union (In re West), 101 B.R. 648, 650 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989)
(affirming bankruptcy court's decision), aff'd, 882 F.2d 1543.
67. West, 882 F.2d at 1545-46.
68. Id at 1546.

69. Id.
70. Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir.

1992).
71. Idat346.
72. Id
73. See id.at 347; see also Capital Communications Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re
Boodrow), 197 B.R. 409, 412 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Parker, 142 B.R. 327, 329 (Bankr.
W.D. Ark. 1992) (providing that notice and time limitations are not intended to abrogate debtor's
substantive rights).
74. See In re Belanger, 118 B.R. 368 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990), aff'd sub nor. Home Owners
Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 128 B.R. 142 (E.D.N.C. 1990), aff'd, 962 F.2d
345.
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redeeming the collateral or reaffirming the debt.75 The court focused on
the phrase "if applicable," reasoning that it allowed the debtor to choose
one of the options in the statute, but if these options were not applicable,
the debtor need not have specified them.7 6 In so holding, the Fourth

Circuit specifically rejected the idea that a debtor desiring to retain
collateral and maintain current installment payments had to seek relief

under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7, reasoning that there would have
been little justification in promulgating section 521(2) if Chapter 13 were

intended by Congress "to be the sole remedy for a debtor who wished to
abide by contractual obligations."77
B.

A Minority of CourtsHolds that Section 521(2) Options Are
Exclusive

The minority view requires the debtor to choose between surrender,
redemption, or reaffirmation,78 even though the debtor is not in default
under the loan or security agreement. Courts adopting th.s reading have
generally maintained that the plain language79 of section 521(2)(A)
requires a debtor to choose one of the listed options and to perform the
75. Belanger, 962 F.2d at 349. The court adopted the principle that § 521(2) "affect[s] only
procedure and not substantive rights of the debtor." Id. at 347 (quoting 3 Lawrence P. King, Collier
on Bankruptcy 521.09A, at 521-48 (15th ed. 1991)). King writes:
[Section 521(2)(C)] was inserted to make clear that the primary purpose of section 521(2) is one
of notice, to remedy creditors' complaints to Congress that they could rot reach debtors'
attorneys and were not permitted to contact pro se debtors at all.... By giving the trustee the
duty of ensuring that actions are taken in a timely manner, Congress interposed a more neutral
party, vested with the trappings of the court, to contact the debtor.
4 Lawrence P. King, Collieron Bankruptcy 521.10[5], at 521-37 (15th ed. rev. 1996).
76. Belanger,962 F.2d at 348.
77. Id.
78. See Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1517 (1lth Cir. 1993)
(holding that Chapter 7 debtors could not retain collateral securing their corsumer debt without
either redeeming property or reaffirming debt); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re
Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1056-58 (6th Cir. 1983) (discussing debtor's options, and referring to § 521(2)
in dicta); Schmidt v. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. (In re Schmidt), 145 B.R. 543, 545 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1992) (finding that reaffirmation or redemption is required to hold on to property); In re
Kennedy, 137 B.R. 302, 304-05 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) (relying on plain language setting forth
alternatives); In re Griffin, 143 B.R. 535, 537 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1991) (requiring debtor to reaffirm,
redeem, or surrender property); Bank South, N.A. v. Home (In re Home), 132 BL 661, 663 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1991) (limiting debtor to choices identified in § 521(2)(A)); In re Chavarria, 117 B.R. 582,
584 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990) (reciting debtor's choices under Code); see also Johnson v. Sun Fin. Co.
(In re Johnson), 89 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1996) (adopting reasoning of In re Edwirds, 901 F.2d 1383,
1387 (7th Cir. 1990)). Edwards was distinguishable from Johnson, however, in that the debtor was
in default at the time of filing.
79. See cases cited infra note 124.
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intended action within a specified period of time.8" The Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits have opted for this approach.
In re Edwards8 is representative of these cases. The debtors filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy and requested approval to continue payments and
retain two cars without reaffirming the debts.82 At the time of filing, the
debtors were current on their obligations.83 After the petition was filed,
Edwards filed a statement of intention, stating a plan to reaffirm the
debts to Merchants National Bank, the holder of the note. However,
Edwards failed to execute the corresponding reaffirmation agreements
within the time period set out in 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(B). 4 The bankruptcy
court ordered Edwards to choose between reaffirming the debt,
redeeming the collateral, or surrendering the vehicles to the bank.8
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit cited a Sixth Circuit decision, In re
Bell,86 in holding that a debtor who wishes to retain secured property
must either redeem or reaffirm, and that redemption cannot be
accomplished through installment payments.87 The Sixth Circuit's
opinion in In re Bell, however, stands only for the proposition that
redemption cannot be accomplished through installment payments; its
comments relating to section 521 are dicta. The Edwards court also
reasoned that reaffirmation is a voluntary negotiation and agreement
between creditor and debtor. On the other hand, permitting a debtor to
retain property while keeping up installment payments, without
reaffirmation of personal liability, would impose a new arrangement on a
creditor and negate the voluntary nature of reaffirmation contemplated
by the statute.88 The court concluded that if such an outcome were
permitted, "no debtor would reaffirm personal liability unless required to
do so.''8
80. See Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386 (relying on language set forth in Bankruptcy Code); Bell, 700
F.2d at 1058 (identifying exclusive methods for retaining collateral); Kennedy, 137 B.R. at 304
(adopting § 521(2) mandatory provisions); Home, 132 B.R. at 663 (discussing statute's clear
language); Chavarria, 117 B.R. at 584 (adopting Edwardsapproach, which gives debtors time limits
and requires actions in accordance with statutory guidelines).
81. 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990).
82. Id. at 1384.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1056-58 (6th Cir.

1983).
87. Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386 (citing Bell, 700 F.2d at 1056-58).
88. Id. (citing Bell, 700 F.2d at 1056).

89. Id
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In addition, the Edwards court noted that "'[t]he 1984 Consumer
Finance Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were intended, inter alia,
to protect creditors from the risk of quickly depreciating assets and to
keep credit cost from escalating because of the too-ready availability of
discharge."'" This legislative purpose strongly suggested to the court
that permitting debtors to improve their positions against secured
creditors by relieving them of personal liability would remove the
incentive to insure and maintain the property. 9' This resul.t would further
depreciate the collateral and drive up the future cost of credit.92 The court
also reasoned that the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and the
spirit of the 1984 amendments support the exclusive approach, stating
that the nonexclusive holding in West renders the statutory scheme set up
by section 521 and section 524 (the specific reaffirmation provision)
93
nugatory.
In In re Taylor,94 the creditor, AGE Federal Credit Union, held a first
lien on the Taylors' vehicles. The Taylors were cun.ent with their
payments to AGE upon filing the bankruptcy petition and remained
current thereafter. The Taylors promptly filed a statement of intent with
respect to the property as required by 11 U.S.C. § 521(2). At the meeting
of creditors, the Taylors stated their intention to retain the vehicles and
remain current on their obligations to AGE without reaffirming or
redeeming the debt.9'
AGE filed a motion to compel the Taylors to comply with section 521
by specifying their intention to either redeem the vehicles or reaffirm the
debts secured by the vehicles.96 The Chapter 7 trustee also filed a motion
to compel and adopted AGE's position. The bankruptcy court entered an
order compelling the Taylors to enter into a reaffirmation agreement or
redeem the property. 97 The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's
order, after which the Taylors appealed.9 8
90. Id. (quoting In re White, 49 B.R. 869, 872 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985)).
91. Id.
92. Id. This argument, however, may be empirically weak. Currently, Chapter 7 bankruptcies are
at an all-time high while the cost of credit is near an all-time low. See Bankrupty FilingsReach AllTime High, supra note 1, at 9; Irby Park, Home Sales "Rock Solid" Say Realtors; Totals Down, but
MarketFavorsBuyers, Chattanooga Free Press, Aug. 24, 1997, at Ml.
93. Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386-87.
94. Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1513 (1 lth Cir. 1993).
95. Id. at 1513-14.
96. Id at 1514.
97. Id. (citing In re Taylor, 138 B.R. 1018 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1992)).
98. Id
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The circuit court rejected the Taylors' argument that the phrase "if
applicable" allows a debtor to retain secured property without selecting
one of the options listed in the statute." The court concluded that the
plain language of section 521 required the opposite result."° The court
reasoned that if the language did not apply to a debtor's surrender of the
property, then it must apply to a debtor's retention of property. 1" The "if
applicable" clause, therefore, would identify any situation in which the
debtor retained the collateral. Furthermore, the court adopted the
reasoning from In re Home 2 that allowing retention of the property
without reaffirmation or redemption would be tantamount to forcing the
creditor into a de facto reaffirmation agreement with no recourse against
the debtor.'0 3 Finally, the court recognized Congress's intent to provide a
debtor with a "fresh start" by allowing the debtor to discharge debts
while retaining assets that are exempt, but argued that allowing a debtor
to retain property without reaffirming or redeeming gives the debtor not
a "fresh start" but a "head start" because the debtor effectively would
be
°4
converting a secured obligation from recourse to nonrecourse debt.'
IV. THE SECTION 521(2) ISSUE SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF THE NONEXCLUSIVE APPROACH
A.

The Nonexclusive Approach Is Correct

The nonexclusive approach, that the redemption or reaffirmation
options are applicable only when triggered by the debtor's election or
some other event, is supported by at least three arguments. First, the
scant legislative history suggests that this section is merely procedural.
Second, section 521(2)(C) indicates that debtors' rights in regard to
property are not to be altered by the section's requirements. Third, the
nonexclusive approach arose out of the congressional policy against
forced reaffirmation. Therefore, as the foundation of the Code, the fresh
start policy mandates adopting the nonexclusive approach.
The fresh start policy underlying the Code acknowledges that secured
obligations will be converted from recourse to nonrecourse debt. Courts
that have adopted the nonexclusive approach support this view because
99. Id at 1516.
100. Id
101. d
102 Bank South, N.A. v. Home (In re Home), 132 B.R. 661 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
103. Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516 (citing Horne, 132 B.R. at 663-64).
104. Id
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of the voluntary nature of reaffirmation agreements. In contrast, courts
that have adopted the exclusive approach unjustifiably fear that allowing
debtors to convert recourse debt into nonrecourse debt will put the debtor
in a "head start" position. The Code recognizes that debtors need a new
opportunity in life and an opportunity for future growth, unhampered by
the pressure of existing debt. This is the balance that the legislature has
struck, a balance that is especially valid considering that the creditor still
receives everything it bargained for under state law except for the ability
to maintain a deficiency judgment.
Section 521(2) Is Merely a ProceduralDevice

1.

The primary purpose of section 521(2) is notice.' The statute was
intended to give creditors information regarding their property without
the hassle of having to reach the debtor's attorney or engage in
unauthorized. communication with a pro se debtor."° Furthermore,
subsections 521(2)(A) and (B) explicitly state a time period within which
the debtor shall give notice and perform with respect to a creditor's
property. However, there is nothing in the statute to suggest that the time
periods are anything more than procedural guidelines. 7
Nonetheless, some courts have relied on subsection (B) to support
their holdings that the options listed in section 521(2) are exclusive.' 8
The section requires the debtor to perform its intention stated in
subsection (A) within forty-five days after the filing of the statement, or
within such additional time as the court may allow. Becaase ordinarily to
"perform" means to fulfill, carry out, or complete, and it may not be
possible to perform the act of retaining and keeping current within fortyfive days, subsection (B) would arguably preclude such an option for the
debtor."0 9 However, an alternative interpretation of this subsection is
more consistent with the legislative intent to provide notice to creditors.
There are, in fact, two such alternative readings of subsection (B).
First, the reference to the "intention with respect to such property, as
specified by subparagraph (A)"" 0 refers only to the intentions specified
105. 4 King, supra note 75, 521.10[5], at 521-37.

106. Id.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(C) (1994); see also Mayton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Mayton), 208
B.R. 61, 65 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Bracamortes, 166 B.R. 160, 162 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1994)).
108. See Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1515-16.
109. Id at 1516.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(B) (1994).
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in that subsection, namely reaffirmation or redemption, and imposes no
similar time deadline for other intentions not specified in subparagraph (A), such as retention without redemption or reaffirmation.'"
Alternatively, retention coupled with continued performance on the loan
obligation could constitute performance within forty-five days. As a
recent bankruptcy court stated, "[T]he debtor can continue to make the
payments as called for under the loan agreement, at least one of which is
likely to become due within that 45-day period."". Furthermore, the
subsequent payment is likely to be due after the debtor's discharge."'
Therefore, "the creditor has a ready remedy in the event of a subsequent
default in continued performance-it can simply repossess the collateral
and pursue its nonbankruptcy remedies, unimpeded by the automatic
stay, which expires as to the debtor and its exempt property upon the
entry of the debtor's discharge." '" 4 This interpretation is consistent with
Congress's primary intentions in enacting section 521(2)(A)-affording
the creditor notice of the debtor's intentions with respect to the collateral
so that the creditor can take appropriate steps to protect its interests." 5
Section 521(2)(C) states that the substantive rights of the debtor with
respect to the property are not to be affected by subsections (A) and
(B). "' 6 Thus, when the debtor fails to comply with these subsections, "the
expiration of those time periods can serve as a signal to the creditor that
it may be time to take action to enforce its lien rights against the
collateral," satisfying the notice requirement under section 521(1)."' The
creditor, at such time, may move for relief from stay to foreclose upon its
collateral, or, in the case of personal property, to repossess; alternatively,
the creditor may walt until the debtor has been granted a discharge under

111. In re Castillo, 209 B.R. 59, 74 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Government
Employees Credit Union v. Castillo (In re Castillo), No. EP-97-CA-206--, 1997 WL 613073 (W.D.
Tex. July 29, 1997). In reversing Castillo, the Texas district court limited the debtor to the three
options set out in § 521(2)(A), but the district court did not take into consideration the distinguishing
fact that the Castillo debtors were current on their payments to the creditor.
112. Id
113. Arguably, as long as the debtor remains current on the obligation to the creditor, the monthly
payment will always be paid within 45 days, thereby satisfying subsection (B). The creditor
agreement generally is for the debtor to make timely payments under the contract
114. Castillo, 209 B.R at 74; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (1994).
115. Castillo, 209 B.R at 74.
116. See I 1 U.S.C. § 521(2XC) (1994); see also supra note 57.
117. In re Bracamortes, 166 B.R. 160, 162 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1994).
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section
524 and pursue its in rem rights against the collateral under state
8
law.1
Another reason for interpreting section 521(2) as a notice section is
that holding otherwise would restrict the trustee's ability to sell
encumbered nonexempt property. If there is equity in the property, the
trustee may sell the collateral, pay the secured claim. from the sale
proceeds, and distribute the remaining proceeds to unsecured creditors.
In such cases, none of the three so-called mandatory alternatives listed in
section 521 has occurred. Therefore, strictly applying the argument that
section 521 is exclusive would remove the trustee's power to sell
encumbered nonexempt property of the estate.119
The Plain Meaning of Section 521(2) Supports a Nonexclusive
Reading

2.

Section 521(2)(C) itself supports the view that the options listed in the
statute are not exclusive. The federal appellate courts that have addressed
the issue, however, have paid little attention to section 521(2)(C), which
provides: "nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall
alter the debtor's or the trustee's rights with regard to such property
under this title."' 0 Instead, these courts have relied on subsections (A)
and (B) to make their interpretations of the statute plausible.''
Nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) is meant to alter any of the
debtor's property rights under Title 1 1 ." Restricting the debtor's
retention options to redemption or reaffimation would undoubtedly alter
the debtor's rights." Some courts have reasoned that if the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous, then judicial interpretation is not
necessary and the court's only function is to enforce the statute according
to its terms.'
118. Id (citing Chandler Bank v. Ray, 804 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1986)); Hngemann v. Chemical
Mortgage Co. (In re Hagemarm), 86 B.R. 125 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
119. See In re Parker, 142 B.R. 327,330 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992).

120. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2j(C).
121. See In re Ogando, 203 B.R. 14, 15 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (discussing interpretation of
I1U.S.C. § 521(2)(A), ()).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(C).
123. This conclusion is persuasive particularly in light of subsection (C)'s location in a statute
whose other subsections all relate to procedure and not substance. See Ogando,203 B.R. at 16.

124. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 761 (1992) (finding that clear statutory language
obviates need for judicial construction of Bankruptcy Code); Taylor v. Freelard & Kronz, 503 U.S.
638 (1992) (same); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (noting that function of
courts need not extend to statutory interpretation when language of statute is plain and has only one
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Reading subsection (C) in conjunction with subsections (A) and (B)
gives clear and unambiguous meaning to the term "if applicable." The
courts adopting the exclusive approach state that the phrase "if
applicable" refers to any election to retain. Thus, under this view,
retention requires redemption or reaffirmation." z Conversely, the courts
adopting the nonexclusive approach give "if applicable" its more general
and natural meaning in the context-that the requirement for the debtor
to specify whether it will redeem or reaffirm is imposed only if the
debtor in fact intends to redeem or reaffirm. These courts appropriately
reason that "if applicable" is otherwise redundant because the option of
redemption or reaffirmation is phrased in the disjunctive.' 26 Thus, both
subsection (C) and the plain meaning of the phrase "if applicable"
support the nonexclusive approach.
3.

TreatingOptions in Section 521(2) as Nonexclusive Furthersthe
CongressionalPolicyAgainst ForcedReaffirinations

Another reason for viewing the options listed in section 521(2) as
nonexclusive is Congress's great concern that debtors be protected from
creditors forcing reaffirmation upon them."27 In section 524(c), Congress
tried to protect debtors by mandating that a reaffirnation agreement
contain a "clear and conspicuous statement which advises the debtor that
such agreement is not required."' 28 Imposing reaffirmation on the debtor
who opts to retain collateral, but who does not redeem, makes
reaffirmation in effect "required."' 29 This is clearly contrary to statutory
intent and contrary to the plain language of the statute. 3 ° Additionally,
such a result would render illusory the right to a determination32by the
debtor's attorney' that the debtor's reaffirmation is "voluntary."'

meaning); see also Connecticut Nat'I Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,254 (1992) (stating that courts

must presume plain meaning of statutes).
125. These courts view § 521(2) as an apparent congressional response to concerns of secured
creditors in consumer bankruptcy cases. See supra note 48.
126. See Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 348

(4th Cir. 1992).
127. See supra note 21.

128. 11 U.S.C. § 524(cX2)(B) (1994).
129. In re Ogando, 203 B.R. 14, 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).
130. Id

131. The 1984 amendments seriously weakened the protection against unwise reaffirmation by
requiring attorneys to bargain with their own clients in the face of the clients' desire to retain
material objects that convey the appearance of wealth, thus undermining the fresh start policy.
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The practicalities of the section 521(2)(A) options make it unlikely
that a Chapter 7 debtor will be able to redeem the collateral in a lump
sum as required by section 722. Most debtors claiming Chapter 7
bankruptcy will not have the liquid assets to make such a payment, nor
will most lenders make a loan to someone who is in or has filed for
bankruptcy. Therefore, if the debtor seeks to retain the collateral, the
only realistic option under the exclusivity approach is reaffirmation.
However, reaffirmation requires the consent of the creditor in order to
comply with section 524(c). '3 In effect, the creditor is able to compel the
debtor either to meet the creditor's terms of reaffirmation or to surrender
the property. This undermines the purpose behind section 722preventing coercive reaffirmation agreements.
4.

The Fresh StartPolicy Supports Adopting the Nonexclusive
Approach
The primary policy of bankruptcy is to provide a debtor with a "fresh

start. '34 This policy would be undermined if redemption or reaffirmation
were the only choices available to a debtor. The debtor would still be
personally liable. Moreover, if debtors are pressured into reaffirning
when current on debt payments, the debtors are in a worse position than
they occupied prior to bankruptcy, because they are then precluded from
obtaining another discharge within six years. Therefore, rather than
providing debtors with a "fresh start," the exclusive approach would give
debtors a "false start" due to their inability to use bankruptcy law for its
intended purpose.'35
Fresh start policy concerns militate in favor of interpreting
section 521(2) to allow the debtors to retain the collateral as long as
debtors remain current on their contract agreements. Once a petition for

See generally Jeffrey W. Morris & Joseph E. Ulrich, Reaffirmation Under the ConsumerBankruptcy
Amendments of 1984: A LoserforAll Concerned,43 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 111 (1986).
132. See In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir. 1990); see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3)(A)
(1994).
133. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1994).
134. See Folendore v. Small Bus. Admin. (Inre Folendore), 862 F.2d 152.7, 1540 (11th Cir.
1989).
135. See generally Boshkoff, supra note 12. See also Debra S. Friedman, 11 U.S.C. Section
521(2)(A): FreshStart or HeadStart?, 22 Pac. L.J. 1239 (1991) (adopting view that labeling statute
as mere notice would be contradictory, and proper approach should be exclusive options).

1216

Taming the Bankruptcy Code's Toothless Tiger
bankruptcy is filed, the policy shifts from responsibility to forgiveness.'36
Chapter 7 discharge provides debtors with a "fresh start," leaving the
debtors' future income free and clear of discharged debts. Therefore, the
"honest but unfortunate debtor... [is afforded a] new opportunity in life
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt.' ' 3 7 Mandating that the debtor
reaffirm a debt, then, undermines the purpose of providing a "fresh start"
to the debtor because personal liability attaches upon reaffirmation.
B.

The Exclusive Approach Is Flawed

Under the nonexclusive approach, the creditor receives everything it
bargained for under state law (collateral and payments) except the ability
to maintain a deficiency judgment against a debtor. Congress struck this
bargain in favor of debtors in order to make them productive citizens in
the community. Some courts take the position that the debtor may neither
insure nor care for the collateral after discharge, and thus punish the
debtor by allowing creditors to impose reaffirmation upon the debtor.
However, courts may be overstating this concern, for failing to insure or
take care of collateral often constitutes a default in the original
agreement, thus allowing repossession after discharge. As a practical
matter, if the debtor has not elected to surrender the property, this
strongly suggests that the debtor values the collateral and will very likely
maintain it and pay it off.
1.

The Exclusive Approach Imposes an UnwarrantedPenalty on the
Debtor

Since the creditor is generally unable to invoke state remedies over a
debtor who is current on a debt, treating section 521(2) options as
exclusive imposes a penalty on the debtor by forcing it to redeem or
reaffirm, thereby creating a default when none exists under state law.
Even though there is no default, adopting the exclusive approach may
cause the debtor to lose the collateral at a time when the debtor's ability
to repurchase through credit is seriously impaired by the bankruptcy.
Generally, redemption is not feasible because the debtor is unable to
136. See 11 U.S.C §§ 727, 1328 (1994). While some debts are excepted from discharge,
exceptions are to be strictly construed. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994); 4 King, supra note 75, T 523.05,
at 523-19 to 523-20.
137. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.

234,244 (1934)).
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provide a lump-sum payment. Consequently, the debtor will probably
lose the collateral, even though the payments are current, or be forced
into a reaffirmation agreement contrary to the voluntary nature of
section 524. The creditor is thereby put in a higher position than it would
be otherwise. The creditor receives everything under the contract, and
potentially receives non-dischargeable debt. In contrast, relieving the
debtor of personal liability does little to harm the interests of the creditor
while fulfilling the underlying policy of the Bankruptcy Code. 3
2.

The DepreciatingValue ofAssetArgument ls Flawed

The argument in favor of the exclusive approach-that creditors will
be harmed by the declining value of the collateral 39-- fails to account for
the payments that the creditors are continually receiving and the interest
rate set by the financing agreement. The exclusive approach does not
allow the debtor who is current on payments to keep the collateral absent
reaffirmation.
Creditors are not left substantially more vulnerable than any other
lender under a consumer installment sales contract. When a debtor is
current on the debt, the creditor is in no worse position than it would
have been but for the bankruptcy petition. In fact, a debtor is more likely
to be able to pay the disputed debt after discharge of other debts.
Furthermore, most debtors opting to retain collateral and keep current on
their contracts do so because they need the assets for peronal purposes.
Finally, the reality of most secured loans is that the lender looks to its
collateral, not the personal liability of the borrower, to guarantee
repayment. For example, a prudent creditor who issues a loan for the
purchase of a home will retain a reasonable down payment so that the

138. Memorandum, Mar. 5, 1997 Draft, Consumer Bankruptcy Working Group, National
Bankruptcy Review Comm'n. The memorandum provided:
A debtor who had filed for bankruptcy could continue to make payments on a secured loan
according to the contract terms without further involvement of counsel or the court. This option
would be available only if the debtor were not in default on the contract at the time of the
bankruptcy (other than by the bankruptcy filing itself) or if the secured creditor had waived any
defaults in writing. If the debtor ceased making payments or if the debtor defaulted on other
contract obligations, such as the obligation to insure, the creditor would be entitled to seek relief
from the stay prior to discharge or to repossess the collateral after the discharge. A creditor
could contact a debtor directly regarding contract defaults, but a creditor could not enter into a
contract with a debtor that would impose personal liability for the repayment of any claim
dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Id

e
139. See In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990).
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loan will amortize at a level below the value of the home. In case of
default, the creditor looks at foreclosure, not the personal liability of the
debtor, to obtain satisfaction on the loan. The remedies of foreclosure or
repossession are controlled by state law and are not affected by
bankruptcy. Thus, contrary to the fears expressed by the courts adopting
the exclusive approach, the collateral is adequately protected."4
Moreover, the creditor may eliminate the risk of the collateral
depreciating faster than the remaining loan amount by obtaining an
appropriate down payment. Assume, for example, that there is no
bankruptcy filing. The creditor's perceived risk of depreciating assets is
still present under its bargain with the debtor. In order to mitigate this
risk, the creditor may request a substantial down payment or incorporate
this risk in the interest rate it charges for the loan. In any event, the
creditor is unable to repossess the collateral, absent bankruptcy, even
though the asset is depreciating. Creditors who argue that depreciating
asset risk is a significant reason for demanding exclusive options are
therefore misguided. One court commented that "creditors scream bloody
murder when debtors have funds to redeem but say that they ought to
redeem when they can't." '' A creditor should not be rewarded for failing
to adequately protect itself just because a debtor has filed for bankruptcy.
Realistically, a creditor secured by an asset that has depreciated below
the amount of the debt is not likely to be any better off with forced
redemption or reaffirmation. The trustee in such a case would probably
abandon the collateral because this decision makes the most economic
sense for the estate. Thus, the creditor's position might be improved if
the debtor were allowed to continue making regular payments. The
Edwards court did not take this into account, but instead punished the
debtors for remaining current on their payments and filing for their legal
right of bankruptcy.
Lastly, the creditor may be concerned that the debtor who is allowed
to retain collateral without reaffirmation may in the future stop making
payments, and at that point the collateral may be worth less than at the
time of bankruptcy. However, this possibility exists absent bankruptcy,
as long as payments continue, and it provides no justification for altering
the terms of the original agreement with the debtor. If the debtor were to
140. See In re Parker, 142 B.R. 327, 331 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992) (citing In re Donley, 131 B.R.
193, 195 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991)); In re Belanger, 118 B.R. 368, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990), aff'd
sub nom. Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 128 B.P 142 (E.D.N.C.
1990), aff'd,962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992).
141. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Ballance (In re Ballance), 33 B.R. 89, 91 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1983).
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default, the creditor would be in the same position, except that it would
have no personal liability against the debtor. Again, as a pl-actical matter,
the lack of personal liability under these circumstances should not carry
much weight because it is likely the debtor would be judgment-proof,
thus the creditor's remedy would be limited to repossession. More
important in these cases is the underlying fresh start policy which tips the
balance in favor of the debtor.
In Edwards, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "when a debtor is
relieved of personal liability on loans secured by collateral, the debtor
has little or no incentive to insure or maintain the property in which a
creditor retains a security interest."' 142 It is unlikely that a debtor would
fail to insure or maintain its investment simply because there is no longer
personal liability for the underlying debt, especially in the case of
collateral that is a home, vehicle, or other essential item. Tie debtor does
not maintain the investment because the debtor has personal liability
attached to it, but rather does so because the debtor desire; the collateral
for whatever personal reason(s) the debtor may have. Furthermore,
failing to insure or maintain the collateral is a typical event of default,
which would permit the secured creditor to accelerate the indebtedness or
repossess the collateral. 4 3 "In fact, default clauses which permit the
lender to declare a default.., are specifically authorized by the Uniform
Commercial Code and may be exercised by a secured lender if it has a
good faith belief that the prospect for payment is impaired."'" Thus, the
creditor is in no worse position than before filing for Chapter 7, and the
fears of depreciation are exaggerated.
V.

CONCLUSION

The express language of section 521(2) and the underlying policy of
the Bankruptcy Code strongly suggest adopting the views expressed by
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits: the options listed in the statute are not
exclusive and therefore the debtor who is current on a debt may retain
the collateral under section 521(2)(A). This section is primarily a notice
requirement giving creditors information about the fate of the collateral.
Section 521(C) also forbids the debtor's substantive rights from being
142. Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386.
143. Parker, 142 B.R. at 331 (holding that debtors were not required to redeem, reaffirm, or
surrender mobile home but could retain mobile home and continue to make monthly payments
without reaffirming debt).
144. Id. at 330; see also Belanger, 118 B.R. at 372; James J. White & Robert S. Summers,
Uniform Commercial Code § 25-3, at 903-06 (4th ed. 1995) (discussing U.C.C. § 1-208).
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altered. Finally, the fresh start policy underlying the Code is most
consistent with this approach.
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuit's limitations of a debtor's options
under section 521(2)(A) to redemption, reaffirmation, or surrender
"[have] resulted in a narrow interpretation of the text of section
521(2)(A) without due regard for the statutory scheme and policy of the
Code."'4 5 This approach results in the substantive rights of the debtor
being altered, contrary to the explicit language of section 521(2)(C).
Additionally, this exclusive approach is premised on the misconception
that a secured creditor's risk of loss is substantially increased by the
debtor's discharge when there is an absence of mandatory redemption,
reaffirmation, or surrender. 46 This assumption fails to recognize both
that the collateral retained after discharge continues to be governed by
the original contract agreement, and that the lender still receives the
benefit of the initial bargain in which the risk of a deficiency upon
default is compensated by timely interest and loan payments. 47
The creditor's loss of its deficiency rights is outweighed by the
Bankruptcy Code's purpose of providing a debtor with a fresh start. The
current split in the circuits on this issue leads to a significant inequity
because debtors are treated differently depending on where they live. For
this reason, Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court should address this
issue and resolve the division among the courts.

145. See Peter H. Carroll IRl, No Retention Without Redemption or Reaffirmation Says Fifth
Circuit,Am. Bankr. Inst. L, Jan. 1997, at 16,39.
146. Edwards,901 F.2d at 1386.

147. See generallyCarroll, supranote 145, at 39.
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